1. assume all conditions that needed for the pure strategy nash equilibrium existence. prove that the…

1. assume all conditions that needed for the pure strategy nash equilibrium existence. prove that the best-response correspondence $b(a)$ has a closed graph.

1. assume all conditions that needed for the pure strategy nash equilibrium existence. prove that the best-response correspondence $b(a)$ has a closed graph.

Answer

Answer:

The best-response correspondence (B(a)) has a closed graph.

Explanation:

Step1: Define closed graph

A correspondence (B: A \rightrightarrows A) has a closed graph if for all sequences ({a_n}{n=1}^\infty \subset A), ({b_n}{n=1}^\infty \subset A) with (a_n \to a), (b_n \to b), and (b_n \in B(a_n)) for all (n), we have (b \in B(a)).

Step2: Set up payoff function

Let (u: A \times A \to \mathbb{R}) be the payoff function, where (A) is the non-empty compact convex strategy set (from pure strategy Nash equilibrium existence conditions). For (a \in A), (B(a) = {b \in A \mid u(b,a) = \max_{b' \in A} u(b',a)}).

Step3: Use continuity of payoff

By Nash equilibrium existence conditions, (u) is continuous in both arguments. For (b_n \in B(a_n)), (u(b_n,a_n) \geq u(b',a_n)) for all (b' \in A), all (n).

Step4: Take limits of inequalities

As (n \to \infty), (a_n \to a), (b_n \to b). Continuity of (u) gives (\lim_{n \to \infty} u(b_n,a_n) = u(b,a)) and (\lim_{n \to \infty} u(b',a_n) = u(b',a)) for all (b' \in A). Taking limits of (u(b_n,a_n) \geq u(b',a_n)) gives (u(b,a) \geq u(b',a)) for all (b' \in A).

Step5: Conclude closed graph

This implies (b \in B(a)), so (B(a)) has a closed graph.